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An earlier Takeaway focusing on 2010 showed the 
necessity of state and federal subsidies to support the 
adoption of residential solar rooftops. Back then, the 
environmental bang for the buck was poor. But now, 
steeply falling solar costs have changed the picture. As 
before, our update looks not only at the costs and benefits 
to the solar adopters, but also to the investor-owned 
electric utilities, to the government, and to the 
environment. Cost reductions in solar panels now make 
subsidies unnecessary, but electric utilities continue to face 
a difficult situation. Two big policy changes are needed. 
Since 2000 in California, solar rooftops have grown from virtu-
ally nil to 958,000 installations, and in 2018 accounted for 
14% of California’s renewable energy production.1 Without tax 
credits, most residential users in 2010 would have found it too 
expensive to adopt solar. However, the cost of solar panels has 
since fallen steeply,2 so it is instructive to see whether those 
tax credits are necessary today.  
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Rapidly falling solar costs make 
rooftop solar viable now 
without subsidies. 
 
Regulators need to restructure 
electricity pricing by splitting it 
into two components—an 
access fee and a usage fee. 
 
The environmental benefit for 
rooftop solar is now much 
closer to passing a cost-benefit 
test. 
2 Using information from a paper by economist 
Severin Borenstein3 and industry sources, we 
calculated how much a typical high consump-
tion residence would spend on a 6 kilo-watt 
(kw) rooftop solar system based on the fixed 
cost of the equipment, tax credits, and monthly 
solar savings (see Table 1).4 In 2010 without 
tax credits that residence would have had to 
pay more for the installation, than they would 
recoup in future electricity savings over the 25-
year life of the solar panels. But with tax cred-
its, even after discounting the future cost sav-
ings from solar (at Borenstein’s recommended 
4% rate), our hypothetical residence did offset 
their subsidized installation costs (+$4,500). 
Now let’s perform the same calculation for 
2019 (see Table 1). The costs of solar installa-
tions have fallen dramatically, California has 
phased out its solar incentives, the federal tax 
credit remains, and due to rising electricity 
prices the present value of future electricity 
cost savings is higher. So in 2019, our solar 
adopter is much better off (+$25,600), and bet-
ter off even in the absence of the solar tax cred-
it (+$20,200). In 2019, it pays to go solar.  
TIME TO LET TAX CREDITS LAPSE 
Tax credits for solar are set to expire in 2019, 
but will they? They have been extended before. 
While they were essential in 2010, the marked 
drop in solar installation costs now make them 
unnecessary. In the current environment of run
-away federal deficit spending, subsidies to the 
solar industry and affluent solar adopters are 
difficult to justify. It is time to let them go.  
LOSSES TO ELECTRICITY PROVIDERS 
Less obvious are the hidden costs solar 
adopters impose on electricity providers and in 
turn on other customers. In California, residen-
tial customers only pay for the electricity deliv-
ered to them, so electricity cost savings to solar 
adopters are a lost revenue to the electric utili-
ties. Obviously, electric utilities will not have to 
purchase the electricity from the wholesale grid 
that solar displaced, but that only offsets about 
a quarter of the lost revenue. The local electrici-
ty providers must make up the difference. But 
who pays for this? Because the electric utilities 
are publicly regulated and investors are guar-
anteed a fair return on their capital, these costs 
are passed along to consumers. Solar adopters 
are ultimately imposing costs on non-solar 
adopters, many of whom may be too poor to 
incur the initial cost of a solar system.  
The full local distribution network must still be 
maintained so when solar households turn on 
appliances at night or on cloudy days, the net-
work will be there to provide service. Yet be-
cause utility providers are essentially compen-
sated for the electricity delivered rather than 
for providing access to the grid, solar rooftop 
adoption has proven to be a big negative. Table 
2 shows that in 2010, the reduced consumption 
from our hypothetical high-consumption solar 
adopter cost the utility $21,500 in discounted 
future revenues because the customer’s savings 
(lost revenue to the provider) is only partially 
offset by reduced power purchases. By 2019, 
the problem is even worse—it’s $32,700.  
These price differentials point to a serious two-
fold problem in the way 
California regulators price 
electricity—increasing 
block tariffs and negligi-
ble access fees for connec-
tion to the electricity grid. 
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  Table 1: Hypothetical High-Consumption Solar Adopter 6 kw Installation  
Year 
Solar 
Install. 
Lifespan 
Electricity 
Savings 
Net Cost 
30% Fed. 
Tax Credit 
California 
Tax Credit 
Net 
Savings 
2010 -$45,000 +$27,000 -$18,000 +$13,500 +$9,000 +$4,500 
2019 -$18,000 +$38,200 +$20,200 +$5,400 $0 +$25,600 
California imposes in-
creasing block tariffs, 
meaning that in 2010 
the biggest users could 
pay marginal prices al-
most four times the 
price paid by the lowest 
users. Thus, high con-
sumption users (paying 
the highest marginal 
prices) are the ones 
most incentivized to 
adopt solar, so they can 
move out of the high 
price blocks into the low price blocks that typi-
cally low-income, low-consumption users pay. 
Electricity providers take a big hit when they 
lose those high-consumption customers. In re-
sponse, the steepness of the block tariffs have 
been reduced with the highest price block now 
being about 2.2 times the baseline rate.  
But even going to a flat-rate tariff would only 
solve part of the problem. The usage-based 
pricing structure still only compensates the 
utility provider when they deliver electricity to 
the households—and not for providing access 
to the electricity grid. The advent of solar roof-
tops means that the providers only receive rev-
enue on their sales to solar customers during 
the shoulder and off-peak, night-time hours. Yet 
it bears the fixed cost of providing a distribu-
tion network that is uncompensated during the 
daytime hours when solar rooftops are provid-
ing electricity. With this type of pricing struc-
ture in place, as more homeowners adopt roof-
top solar, the utility providers will incur greater 
losses, forcing them to request increases to the 
tariff schedules. Frank Wolak, a Stanford econo-
mist, found that two-thirds of the increase in 
residential distribution network prices be-
tween 2003 and 2016 can be attributed to the 
growth in distributed solar capacity.5  
A PROPOSED FIX FOR REGULATORS 
The economist’s prescription is to split the pric-
ing of electricity into two components—an ac-
cess fee and a usage fee.6 Charging a fixed 
monthly access fee would compensate the utili-
ty provider for maintaining the electrical grid, 
and would allow the usage charges to be sub-
stantially reduced. For our hypothetical high- 
consumption user, there are a variety of pricing 
structures that could alleviate electricity pro-
viders’ losses and still provide an incentive to 
adopt solar. For example, assuming a flat usage 
fee of $.14/kwh and a monthly access fee of 
$215/month7 would completely eliminate the 
loss to the electricity provider (see Table 2). 
Since the monthly access fee is payable whether 
or not one adopts solar, it removes the artificial 
incentive to adopt solar created by sole reliance 
on usage-based pricing, while our household 
would still have a positive incentive to adopt 
solar (+$1,000)—even without tax credits!  
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 
The environmental benefits for our hypothet-
ical solar adopter in terms of reduced carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions to the atmosphere is 
2.77 tons less carbon annually than if a com-
bined cycle natural gas plant had produced the 
3 
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Table 2: Total Costs and Benefits for All Groups Assuming a Hypothetical 
High-Consumption California Solar Adopter: 2010 & 2019  
 
Solar 
Adopter 
Electricity 
Provider 
Govern-
ment 
Environ-
ment 
Net Impact 
(over 25 years) 
2010 Economics      
No Tax Credit –$18,000 –$21,500 $0 +$2,600 –$36,900 
With Tax Credit +$4,500 –$21,500 –$22,500 +$2,600 –$36,900 
2019 Economics      
No Tax Credit +$20,200 –$32,700 $0 +$2,600 –$9,900 
With Tax Credit +$25,600 –$32,700 –$5,400 +$2,600 –$9,900 
2019 Proposed      
No Tax Credit +$1,000 $0 $0 +$2,600 +$3,600 
With Tax Credit +$6,400 $0 -$5,400 +$2,600 +$3,600 
those 8,340 kwh of electricity.8 Over the 25-
year life of the rooftop solar system, that 
amounts to 69.4 less tons of CO2. Putting a price 
on a ton of CO2 has led to a vast economic liter-
ature with no consensus. For our calculations 
we used the EIA estimate of $37/ton of CO2 re-
sulting in a $2,600 benefit to the environment.  
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
As shown in Table 2, summing the costs and 
benefits to all four groups—consumers, elec-
tricity providers, government, and the environ-
ment—results in a significant net loss for our 
2010 solar adoption. Clearly, in 2010 without 
large subsidies solar rooftops were not eco-
nomic even for our hypothetical high consump-
tion household. Furthermore, the modest envi-
ronmental benefits could not justify the pro-
gram. The falling cost of solar now results in a 
much smaller net loss, households have more 
incentive to adopt solar even without subsidies, 
and the environmental benefit is much closer to 
passing a cost-benefit test. Our analysis sug-
gests that replacing increasing block tariffs 
with flat rates and instituting a substantial ac-
cess fee to the distribution system is workable 
and could actually yield positive net benefits. 
Under such a pricing scheme, consumers would 
still have incentives to adopt solar, electricity 
providers could be fully compensated, govern-
ment could eliminate the tax credit, and the en-
vironment is made better. The prognosis for 
solar in 2019 is now much better, but work re-
mains to be done in Washington on the tax 
credits and at the California Public Utility Com-
mission on restructuring electricity rates for a 
world with solar rooftops.  
4 
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Notes: 
1 California Energy Commission (2019). https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/
renewables/tracking_progress/documents/renewable.pdf 
2 See https://news.energysage.com/how-much-does-the-average-solar-
panel-installation-cost-in-the-u-s/ 
3 Borenstein, S. (2017). Private net benefits of residential solar PV: The 
role of electricity tariffs, tax incentives, and rebates. Journal of the 
Association of Environmental & Resource Economists, 4(S1), S85–S122.  
4 Our earlier Takeaway assumed a 10 kw installation which was 
unnecessarily large. We have refined some other assumptions as well. 
5 Wolak, F. (2018, Sept). The Evidence from California on the economic 
impact of inefficient distribution network pricing. NBER Working Paper 
No. 25087. doi: 10.3386/w25087. 
6 Zajac, E. (1978). Fairness or efficiency: An introduction to public utility 
pricing. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
7 In order to implement such a pricing strategy, the monthly access fees 
would differ across customer groups. In fact, Wolak has proposed a 
formula to compute customer-specific access charges.  
8 Only an insignificant amount of coal is used in California for electricity 
production. See https://www.energy.ca.gov/almanac/electricity_data/
electricity_generation.html.  
 
